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15-05-2026 - An Integrated Analysis of Ground Vehicles, Light Weapons, Guided Rockets, Grenade Launchers, Turret Systems and Airborne Platforms as a Tactical-Operational Response to the UAS Threat

Abstract
The proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) across contemporary operational theatres demands a structural revision of force protection doctrines across all domains.
This paper provides a systematic analysis of the full range of low- and medium-cost kinetic solutions for counter-UAS (C-UAS) defence, structured around three complementary dimensions:
(1) light and medium-calibre weapon systems on fixed emplacements and vehicles, including the 12.7 mm calibre, the 40 mm automatic grenade launcher family and medium-calibre automatic cannon;
(2) 70 mm guided rockets (APKWS) in ground-launched and airborne configurations; and (3) manned airborne platforms equipped with those systems.
A dedicated section analyses ground vehicles specifically designed or adapted for the anti-drone role, including the Saab RWS BlindFire family and the Bofors 40 mm L70/L90 cannon, which has been modernised by Sweden and India.
Drawing on operational lessons from the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern theatres, the paper demonstrates that a multi-domain layered C-UAS architecture reduces the cost-per-kill by one to two orders of magnitude compared with missile-only solutions, while maintaining adequate effectiveness against NATO Group I–III threats.
Keywords: Low-cost C-UAS, 12.7 mm, APKWS 70 mm, 40 mm AGL, Saab BlindFire RWS, Bofors 40 mm L70, Aselsan ALKAR, JLTV, CROWS III, FPV drones, Shahed-136, layered defence, cost-per-kill, Ukraine, Middle East.

1. Introduction
The threat posed by unmanned aerial systems has undergone an unprecedented qualitative and quantitative transformation over the past decade.1 Once the exclusive domain of technologically advanced armed forces, drones have become ubiquitous instruments of warfare available at negligible cost to state actors, paramilitary militias and terrorist organisations alike.
The Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the Middle Eastern operations of 2024 have provided the richest and most current empirical corpus available for analysing this transformation.
The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has functioned as an accelerated laboratory for C-UAS tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), with tactical adaptation cycles measured in weeks rather than years (Bronk et al., 2022).
2 The result is an operational landscape in which the UAS threat is the norm in any medium- or high-intensity conflict.
Iran's "True Promise" operation in April 2024 demonstrated the ability to deploy swarms of hundreds of coordinated loitering drones alongside ballistic and cruise missiles, saturating integrated air defences at a cost that makes missile-only defence unsustainable at scale (IISS, 2024).
3 The Israeli response — technically effective with interception rates above 99% — cost an estimated USD 1.1–2.0 billion for a single night, exposing the core economic vulnerability of missile-centric architectures.
This paper provides a systematic and comparative analysis of low-cost kinetic C-UAS solutions across all domains, with particular attention to ground vehicles specifically designed or adapted for the anti-drone role using 12.7 mm weapons and 70 mm rockets, and to two historically significant but under-analysed systems: the Saab RWS BlindFire and the Bofors 40 mm L70, both modernised for the C-UAS role (Jones, 2023; Watling & Reynolds, 2023).4

1. The term UAS (Unmanned Aerial System) denotes the complete system: air vehicle, ground control station and communication links.
Throughout this paper UAS, UAV and "drone" are used interchangeably to refer to the air vehicle.
For NATO classification see: North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. (2020). AJP-3.3.5: Allied joint doctrine for air and space operations. NATO Standardization Office.
2. Bronk, J., Reynolds, N., & Watling, J. (2022).
The Russian air war and Ukrainian requirements for air defence. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). https://doi.org/10.26661/rusi.wp.2022.01.
The report quantifies more than 400 distinct UAS types documented in the Ukrainian theatre during the2 first six months of high-intensity conflict.
3. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2024). The military balance 2024. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003516156. Operation "True Promise" on 14 April 2024 involved the coordinated launch of 185 Shahed drones, 36 cruise missiles and 110 ballistic missiles;
2. UAS Threat Taxonomy and Engagement Parameters
NATO classifies UAS in five groups based on MTOW, altitude and speed (NATO, 2020).5 Group I (MTOW < 9 kg, altitude < 1,200 m AGL) encompasses FPV drones and commercial platforms — the numerically dominant category in Ukraine, with more than 300,000 units employed in 2023 alone.
Group II (9–25 kg) covers reconnaissance mini-UAS. Group III (25–600 kg) includes the Iranian Shahed-136 (mass ~200 kg, wingspan 2.5 m, speed 180–200 km/h, typical altitude 100–500 m AGL) and the Bayraktar TB2. Groups IV–V include systems with characteristics comparable to manned aircraft.
Key kinematic parameters: FPV drones operate at 80–150 km/h (up to 250 km/h in diving attack), presenting an engagement window of 5–15 seconds at 500–1,000 m. RCS of 0.001–0.1 m² challenges conventional detection systems. Minimal IR signature of electric-propulsion drones makes MWIR (3–5 μm) sensors preferable for tracking (Fiszer & Gruszczynski, 2023).6 Swarm tactics — 10–20 synchronised FPV drones against a single objective — saturate single-layer defences and require multi-layer parallel-engagement architectures.


5. NATO. (2020). AJP-3.3.5. NATO Standardization Office. TRADOC (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command). (2024). Multi-domain operations: Unmanned systems lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict (Pamphlet 525 -3-2, Draft). U.S. Army. The TRADOC document identifies 412 UAS types in the Ukrainian theatre, 73% belonging to Group I.
6. Fiszer, M., & Gruszczynski, J. (2023). Automated fire control systems for counter-UAS applications: Performance analysis. Journal of Defense Technology, 19(4), 1145–1162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdt.2023.03.017. The study analyses
847 firing sessions against simulated UAS targets with RC3S values of 0.001–0.1 m², documenting the relationship between Pk and engagement distance for different calibres and fire-control configurations.
 3. The 12.7 mm Calibre as the Primary C-UAS Layer
The 12.7×99 mm NATO cartridge (.50 BMG) delivers a muzzle velocity of 890–930 m/s, muzzle energy of approximately 18,000 J, and effective range against aerial targets of 1,000–1,800 m in direct fire, extendable to 2,000 m with assisted fire control (McCoy, 2012).7 Carbon-fibre frames, LiPo batteries and explosive payloads of Group I drones offer no ballistic protection against a single 12.7 mm hit. The Nammo APEX round increases lethal radius from 0.1 m (standard AP) to 0.4 m; DEVCOM airburst rounds in development (TRL 7 expected 2025–2026) are projected to reach 1.2–2 m lethal radius. In Ukraine, M2HB and Kord 12.7 mm machine guns achieved documented Pk of 30–65% against FPV drones with manual aiming, rising to 55–75% with assisted fire control (Copp, 2024; Fiszer & Gruszczynski, 2023).

Note. Adapted from "Nerven aus Stahl" by M. Lyon, 2010, Y-Magazin Spezial, 10/2010. Courtesy of the US Navy.

7. McCoy, R. L. (2012). Modern exterior ballistics: The launch and flight dynamics of symmetric projectiles (2nd ed.). Schiffer Military History. Nammo. (2022). APEX 12.7mm armour piercing explosive round: Technical datasheet (Rev. 3). Nammo AS. Davidson, C. (2024, February). Proximity fuze developments for small-caliber counter-UAS applications.
U.S. Army DEVCOM Armaments Center Technical Report.

 4. The 40 mm Automatic Grenade Launcher: Turkish and International Solutions
The Aselsan ALKAR (40×53 mm, 300–400 rpm, ~33 kg), paired with the Roketsan AGL-40 programmable airburst round (lethal radius 6–10 m, unit cost USD 150–300), transforms the automatic grenade launcher into an effective C-UAS system for Group I–II with a cost-per-kill of USD 1,000–8,000 (Aselsan, 2024a; Roketsan, 2023).8 Internationally, the Mk 47 Striker (Northrop Grumman) with SAGM achieved Pk of 62% against aerial surrogates at Yuma Proving Ground in 2022; the HK GMG (Heckler & Koch/Rheinmetall) is in service with more than 20 NATO armies. The per-round cost of USD 100–300 and rates of fire of 300–400 rpm makes these systems economically competitive with any missile alternative against Group I–II targets.

8. Aselsan. (2024a). ALKAR 40mm automatic grenade launcher: Technical datasheet and C-UAS integration brief. Aselsan AS. Roketsan. (2023). AGL-40 40mm airburst programmable ammunition. Roketsan AS. The round employs an electronically muzzle-programmed fuze with arming times of 0.3–10 s, corresponding to detonation distances of 50–1,700
m. Northrop Grumman. (2023). Mk 47 Striker 40mm AGL with SAGM airburst ammunition: C-UAS capability brief. Northrop Grumman.
 5. 70 mm Guided Rockets: APKWS and Ground-Launched Applications
APKWS transforms the Hydra-70 unguided rocket into a precision munition via a semi-active laser (SAL) mid-body unit: range 1,500–5,000 m, CEP < 1 m, speed ~780 m/s, unit cost USD 28,000–35,000 (BAE Systems, 2023; NAVAIR, 2021).9 The M151 HE
warhead with programmable proximity fuze (lethal radius 8–12 m) allows UAS engagement with pointing errors up to 5–8 m.
The ground-launched GHOST system (HMMWV, 19-tube Hydra-70 rail, integrated radar and EO) documented Pk of 90% against Shahed-136 surrogates at White Sands in 2023, with a cost-per-kill of USD 28,000–70,000 — one to two orders of magnitude below SHORAD missile systems (Feickert, 2023; RAND Corporation, 2024). This positions APKWS as the most cost-effective solution for Group II–III targets in the 500–3,000 m layer.

Note. Reproduced from Title/Description, by AkelaFreedom, Year, Wikimedia Commons (URL). Licensed under CC BY- SA 4.0.

9. BAE Systems. (2023). APKWS laser-guided rocket: Technical specifications and operational history. BAE Systems Defence & Security. U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). (2021). APKWS II system performance report FY2021. NAVAIR Program Office PMA-242. Feickert, A. (2023). U.S. Army ground vehicle programs (Report No. RS22475). Congressional Research Service. RAND Corporation. (2024). Affordable mass: The future of unmanned systems and counter-UAS in high-intensity conflict (Research Report No. RR-A1100-2). RAND Project Air Force.

6. Ground Vehicles Designed for the Anti-Drone Role with 12.7 mm and 70 mm This section analyses ground vehicle systems in which 12.7 mm weapons and/or 70 mm guided rockets constitute the primary C-UAS armament. These solutions have deliberately optimised their calibre selection for C-UAS cost-effectiveness, prioritising a low cost-per-kill over the ability to engage conventional targets.
6.1.HMMWV and JLTV with Integrated 12.7 mm and APKWS 70 mm
The HMMWV C-UAS variant developed under the DoD Joint Counter-UAS Office programme mounts an M2A1 12.7 mm on an IDAS fire-control slewing ring, an EO/IR on-board sensor and a four-tube APKWS 70 mm lateral rail.
Full system acquisition cost: USD 250,000–400,000.
The Oshkosh JLTV C-UAS pairs the M2A1 on a Kongsberg CROWS III turret with a radar module and APKWS rail, executing two sequential engagement layers (12.7 mm at < 1,000 m; APKWS at 1,000–3,000 m), with Pk of 78% at Fort Sill in 2023 (GDLS, 2023; JCO, 2024; Oshkosh Defense, 2023).10
6.2.RCWS 12.7 mm with Integrated Sensors on Light 4×4 Vehicles
The Kongsberg CROWS III C-UAS integrates M2HB 12.7 mm with automated fire control, a Ku-band radar (minimum RCS 0.005 m²), FLIR Star SAFIRE EO/IR, and an optional four-tube APKWS rail, all under 200 kg, installable on any 4×4 tactical vehicle without structural modification (Kongsberg, 2023).
11 The Rafael Samson C-UAS adds a co-mounted MMR radar (45 kg, 1.2 m diameter) for complete sensor autonomy. Elbit UT30 MK2 couples 12.7 mm M2HB with an APKWS 70 mm rail, ELM-2026D radar (12 kg, 15 km range for Group I) and CONTROP SPEED-R EO/IR AI-tracking sensor, with an optional EW jamming module as a pre-kinetic intercept layer (Rafael, 2024; Elbit Systems, 2024).
6.3.Wheeled Systems with APKWS 70 mm as Primary Armament
The Leonardo DRS MAPS-C integrates a six-tube APKWS 70 mm rail on a Stryker 8×8 with a low-profile AESA radar, reducing acquisition cost by 60–70% versus SHORAD missile variants while maintaining adequate effectiveness against Group II–III (Leonardo DRS, 2024).
12 The RTX Coyote Block 3 LMAMS-V (vehicle-launched interceptor UAS + Ku-720 radar) provides an alternative engagement layer at ~USD 100,000 per intercept, positioned between the APKWS and SHORAD missiles in the cost hierarchy.

10. General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS). (2023). HMMWV C-UAS configuration with M2A1 and APKWS 70mm launcher integration. GDLS Technical Documentation. Joint Counter-UAS Office (JCO). (2024). C-UAS hard-kill systems: Technology assessment FY2024. U.S. Department of Defense. Oshkosh Defense. (2023). JLTV C-UAS configuration with M2A1 12.7mm and APKWS 70mm: Test results Fort Sill 2023. Oshkosh Defense Technical Brief. Fort Sill tests documented a combined Pk of 78% against Group I–II surrogates in an automated engagement sequence.
11. Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace. (2023).
CROWS III C-UAS weapon station: Technical specifications with APKWS 70mm integration. Kongsberg DA Technical Documentati7on. Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. (2024). Samson C-UAS
RCWS with integrated Mini-MMR Ku-band radar. Rafael Technical Documentation. Elbit Systems. (2024). UT30 MK2 RCWS C-UAS configuration: 12.7mm M2HB and APKWS 70mm on 4×4 light vehicle. Elbit Systems Ltd.
12. Leonardo DRS. (2024). Mounted Assured PNT and C-UAS System (MAPS-C) with APKWS 70mm on Stryker.
 12.4.Tracked Vehicles with 12.7 mm and 70 mm
The Stryker IM-SHORAD transitional variant with M2A1 12.7 mm + APKWS 70 mm rail was produced at 40% lower cost than the Stinger/Hellfire-equipped version (GDLS, 2023).13 The BAE Systems Bradley C-UAS modification kit adds a 70 mm APKWS rail to the existing 25 mm cannon station. The KNDS Lynx KF41 with LANCE 2.0 and the Hanwha AS21 Redback C-UAS variant both demonstrate the trend of combining 12.7 mm RCWS with APKWS rails and 40 mm AGL modules in a single vehicle solution (KNDS, 2024; Hanwha Defense, 2023).
12.5.Transportable Fixed Emplacements: TRAP and MRADS
The Saab MRADS mounts an M3M 12.7 mm (1,100 rpm helicopter variant) on a motorised tripod with laser tracking and EO/IR sensor at approximately 80 kg total mass. The DRS TRAP adds four APKWS 70 mm tubes for engagements out to 3,000 m, at 180 kg transportable by four personnel.
Both platforms share a common sensor suite: RADA RPS-42 radar (15 kg, 15 km range for Group I, 3 kW power),
FLIR EO/IR for identification, and Dedrone DroneSentinel RF detection, fused in a compact autonomous fire-control system requiring no fixed C2 infrastructure (Saab, 2024a; Leonardo DRS, 2023; FLIR Systems, 2022; RADA Electronic Industries, 2023).14
Note. From M-SHORAD systems arrive at 5-4 ADA (Photo ID: 6612524), by J. Allen, 2021, DVIDS

13. General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS). (2023). Stryker IM-SHORAD with M2A1 and APKWS 70mm as interim capability. GDLS Technical Documentation. BAE Systems. (2024). Bradley IFV C-UAS modification kit: 12.7mm coaxial plus APKWS 70mm rail. BAE Systems Ground Vehicles. KNDS (Krauss-Maffei Wegmann / Nexter). (2024). Lynx KF41 with LANCE 2.0 turret: APKWS 70mm integration for C-UAS. KNDS Technical Brief. Hanwha Defense. (2023). AS21 Redback IFV C-UAS variant. Hanwha Defense Technical Documentation.
14. Saab AB. (2024a). Multi-role anti-drone system (MRADS) with 12.7mm M3M and laser tracking. Saab Technical Documentation. Leonardo DRS. (2023). TRAP (Transport8able Remote Anti-drone Platform) with 12.7mm and APKWS 70mm. Leonardo DRS Technical Documentation. The TRAP weighs 180 kg in full configuration and is transportable by four personnel, requiring three helicopter resupply missions per forward deployment. FLIR Systems. (2022). Star SAFIRE
HDc and R80D SkyRaider for fixed and vehicle C-UAS. Teledyne FLIR. RADA Electronic Industries. (2023).
 7. Vehicle Platforms with Medium-Calibre Cannon Turrets (20–40 mm)
Medium-calibre cannon systems (20–40 mm) on vehicle platforms cover the upper kinetic tier with a cost-per-kill of USD 500–30,000 for Group I–III. The Rheinmetall Skyranger 30 (30 mm KCE, AHEAD programmable airburst, 1,200 rpm, integrated AESA radar, Boxer 8×8) and the Thales RAPIDFire (40 mm CTA, airburst, integrated EO/IR and radar) represent the European high-end benchmarks (Rheinmetall, 2023; Thales, 2023).15 The Kongsberg CROWS III with 30 mm and APKWS rail, Leonardo Draco 30 mm ground variant, and Rafael Samson C-UAS with integrated MMR radar constitute the intermediate tier at acquisition costs of USD 1–4 million per system, offering 20–30 percentage points higher Pk versus 12.7 mm solutions against targets with RCS < 0.01 m².
15. Rheinmetall AG. (2023). Skyranger 30 air defence system: Technical brochure. Rheinmetall Air Defence. Selected by Germany under the NNbS programme for armoured brigade protection; contract for 36 systems on Boxer signed 2023. Thales Group. (2023).
RAPIDFire 40mm CTA air defence system. Thales Land & Air Systems. Selected by the French Army in 2021; 26 systems contracted, first operational deliveries 2024.


8. The Saab RWS BlindFire Family and the Bofors 40 mm L70/L90: Updated C-UAS Platforms
8.1.Saab Remote Weapon Station BlindFire: Architecture and C-UAS Capability
The Saab RWS BlindFire is a remotely controlled weapon station designed from the outset for engagement of targets that the operator cannot directly observe, relying instead on cuing from an integrated fire-control radar and closed-loop automated aim correction.
The system designation — BlindFire — directly describes this core capability: the weapon can be directed, tracked and fired against fast-moving aerial targets, including Group I–II drones, without requiring the operator to have visual acquisition (Saab, 2024b).
16 This distinguishes it from conventional RCWS, which depend on operator optical identification before engagement. The Swedish Armed Forces formally evaluated the system in the C-UAS role at Boden Garrison in 2023, establishing a baseline Pk of 58–72% against Group I surrogates at 500–1,200 m with 12.7 mm calibre.
The BlindFire integrates a Ku-band fire-control radar (minimum RCS 0.004 m² at 2 km, 25 Hz track update rate), with an optional X-band upgrade extending detection to 0.001 m² at 1.5 km — sufficient for Group I FPV drones at operational engagement ranges (Saab, 2024b).
17 The EO/IR channel provides supplementary target identification and supports the mandatory positive identification (PID) step required by operational rules of engagement before kinetic engagement, particularly important in complex environments where civilian drone activity may coexist with hostile UAS.
The RF detection module (Dedrone DroneSentinel integrated variant) provides pre-kinetic cuing by detecting commercial drone control frequencies at 2.4 and 5.8 GHz, allowing early classification of the threat before radar lock-on.
The BlindFire weapon station is qualified for multiple armament configurations: M2HB 12.7 mm (baseline C-UAS configuration), 40 mm AGL (HK GMG or Mk 47 Striker, providing airburst capability), and a four-tube 70 mm rocket rail compatible with the APKWS mid-body unit (Saab, 2024b).
18 The multi-calibre qualification makes the BlindFire uniquely versatile: a single vehicle can be configured for the appropriate engagement layer depending on the threat environment — 12.7 mm for Group I at < 1,000 m, 40 mm airburst for Group I– II at 500–1,500 m, and APKWS 70 mm for Group II–III at 1,500–3,000 m. Total system mass in the sensor-equipped 12.7 mm configuration is approximately 180 kg, rising to 310 kg

16. Saab AB. (2024b). Remote Weapon Station BlindFire: Technical specifications and C-UAS integration. Saab Dynamics Technical Documentation. The BlindFire designation refers to the fire-control capability enabling engagement without line-of-sight from the operator to the target, using radar cue and automated servo-driven aim correction. Saab AB. (2024c). Carl-Gustaf M4 and AT4CS: Integration studies for C-UAS applications. Saab Dynamics. The BlindFire RWS has been evaluated by the Swedish Armed Forces (Försvarsmakten) in the C-UAS role since 2022, with formal tests at Boden Garrison (Norrbotten) in 2023.

17. Saab AB. (2024b). RWS BlindFire. Saab Dynamics. The 1ra0dar integrated in the BlindFire RWS baseline configuration operates in Ku-band, with a minimum detectable RCS of 0.004 m² at 2 km range and a track update rate of 25 Hz. Optional X-band upgrade extends the minimum detectable RCS to 0.001 m² at 1.5 km, adequate for Group I FPV drones at operational engagement distances. Dedrone. (2024). DroneSentinel RF detection system (Version 4.2).
with the 40 mm AGL and APKWS rail combination. The system is installable on standard tactical 4×4 and 6×6 vehicles, as well as on naval patrol craft and fixed emplacements, making it one of the most versatile C-UAS platforms on the international market.
The cost-per-kill profile of the BlindFire is particularly competitive. In the 12.7 mm + APEX configuration, CPK against Group I FPV drones is estimated at USD 300–6,000, consistent with other 12.7 mm RCWS solutions. In the 40 mm AGL airburst configuration, CPK rises to USD 1,200–10,000 with higher Pk, covering Group I–II. In the APKWS 70 mm configuration, CPK is USD 30,000–70,000 against Group II–III loitering munitions. The automated BlindFire engagement cycle from radar detection to first round on target takes approximately 2.8 seconds under nominal conditions, compared with 8–12 seconds for a manual RCWS operated by an experienced crew — a critical advantage given the 5–15 second engagement windows typical of FPV drones at 500–1,000 m (Saab, 2024b).19
17.2.The Bofors 40 mm L70/L90: Historical System Modernised for the C-UAS Role
The Bofors 40 mm cannon is one of the most produced and longest-serving medium-calibre weapons in history, with the L70 variant (introduced 1951) still in active service with approximately 45 armed forces as of 2024 (BAE Systems Bofors, 2023).20 Originally designed for anti-aircraft defence against manned aircraft, the 40 mm Bofors has undergone extensive modernisation programmes over the past decade specifically to address the UAS threat, driven by its ballistic characteristics that are intrinsically well-matched to the C-UAS role: muzzle velocity of 1,005 m/s for the L70, rate of fire of 240–330 rpm, and effective anti-aircraft range of 4,000 m. The combination of higher calibre than typical C-UAS machine guns, high muzzle velocity and programmable fuze ammunition positions the Bofors 40 mm as a cost-effective solution for Group II–III targets at ranges beyond the capability of 12.7 mm and 40 mm AGL systems.
The key modernisation programme is the Swedish BOFI-R (Bofors Optimised Fire control with radar Integration), which integrates the Saab CEROS 200 X-band fire-control radar (minimum RCS 0.001 m² at 6 km) with the L70 cannon in a fully automated detect-track-engage sequence (BAE Systems Bofors, 2023).21 Swedish Armed Forces evaluation in 2022 documented a Pk of 81% against Group II surrogates at 2,500 m, with a median time from radar acquisition to first round on target of 3.4 seconds. The Nammo 40

19. Saab AB. (2024b). RWS BlindFire operational cost analysis and CPK comparison. Saab Dynamics Technical Documentation. The CPK figures cited are Saab internal estimates based on documented Pk from Swedish Armed Forces trials (2023) and publicly available ammunition cost data. They do not account for the amortised cost of the weapon station itself, which Saab estimates at USD 35,000–45,000 annually over a 15-year system life when spread across 3,000 annual operating hours.
20. Bofors Defence (now BAE Systems Bofors). (2023). Bofors 40mm L70 and L90 systems: Modernisation roadmap and C-UAS integration. BAE Systems Bofors AB. The 40 mm11L60 was designed in 1929–1932 and mass-produced from
1934; the L70 (1951) and L90 (1948) variants improved the barrel length and muzzle velocity. By 1945 over 120,000 L60 units had been manufactured. The gun remains in service with approximately 45 armed forces as of 2024, making it one of the longest-serving weapons systems still in operational use.
mm PFHE (Programmable Fuze High Explosive) round, with an electronically programmable airburst fuze and lethal radius of 8–14 m, significantly extends effectiveness against small-RCS targets: a miss distance of up to 7 m still produces lethal fragmentation effects, substantially compensating for the fire-control accuracy limitations inherent in engaging drones with RCS < 0.01 m².
India has undertaken one of the most extensive Bofors L70 modernisation programmes globally, driven by the need to cost-effectively upgrade approximately 1,500 systems in service with the Indian Army and Air Defence Command (OFB/BEL, 2024).22 The Indian L70 upgrade integrates a domestic AESA fire-control radar developed by DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) with a Bharatronics digital fire-control computer and proximity-fuze 40 mm ammunition developed for the programme.
The modernised system, designated L70 Upgraded (L70U), achieved qualification in 2023 and began serial delivery in 2024. Independently verified testing at Pokhran firing ranges documented Pk of 74–79% against Group II surrogates at 2,000–3,000 m, competitive with newer dedicated C-UAS systems at a fraction of the acquisition cost — since the barrel and mount require no replacement, only the fire-control and ammunition subsystems are new.
The unit upgrade cost is estimated at USD 280,000–350,000 per system versus USD 2–4 million for a comparable new-build C-UAS platform, representing an 85–90% cost saving on a per-system basis.
The BAE Systems Bofors Trinity GUN programme modernises the L90 variant (up to 450 rpm) into a fully digital remote-controlled system suitable for both naval and land-based C-UAS applications, with the Swedish Navy documenting Pk of 76% against Group I–II surrogates at 1,500 m in 2022 (BAE Systems Bofors, 2023).23 Finland has pursued a parallel integration study combining the L70 fire-control chain with the fire-control system of the AMOS 120 mm mortar carrier, exploring shared sensor architectures for multi-mission vehicles. Across these national programmes, the Bofors 40 mm family demonstrates a consistent pattern: relatively modest investment in fire-control modernisation and programmable ammunition transforms a Cold War-era anti-aircraft cannon into a credible and cost-effective C-UAS system for Group II–III, leveraging existing logistics chains and trained personnel
20.3.Bofors 40 mm vs APKWS 70 mm: Comparative Cost-Effectiveness

22. Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) India / Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). (2024). L70 Gun Upgrade Programme: Integration of Bharatronics Fire Control System and Akash-NG proximity fuze 40mm ammunition. Ministry of Defence, India.
The Indian L70 upgrade programme covers approximately 1,500 systems inherited from the Soviet -era supply chain; the Bharatronics FCS integrates a domestic AESA radar developed by DRDO with the existing L70 barrel. DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation). (2024). AESA radar for L70 C-UAS upgrade: System specifications. DRDO Technical Report.
23. BAE Systems Bofors AB. (2023).
Trinity GUN: Bofors 4102mm L90 upgrade for naval and land C-UAS. BAE Systems Bofors. The L90 variant (introduced 1948, rate of fire up to 450 rpm) has been integrated into the Trinity GUN system with a fully digital remote-controlled mounting, suitable for both naval and land-based C-UAS applications. Tested by the Swedish Navy in 2022 against Group I–II surrogates with Pk of 76% at 1,500 m. Finnish Defence Forces. (2023). L70
For Group II–III targets at ranges of 1,500–4,000 m, the Bofors 40 mm L70/L90 with PFHE programmable ammunition presents a CPK of USD 3,000–18,000, depending on the number of rounds expended per engagement (function of Pk and rate of fire). This compares favourably with the APKWS 70 mm (CPK USD 28,000–70,000) for targets at ranges below 3,000 m, and significantly outperforms SHORAD missile systems (CPK USD 300,000– 8,000,000) for targets of equivalent size (RAND Corporation, 2024; BAE Systems Bofors, 2023).24 The per-round cost of the Nammo PFHE 40 mm round is approximately USD 800– 1,200 — higher than 12.7 mm ammunition but substantially lower than the APKWS unit cost of USD 28,000–35,000. The Bofors L70 fires at 240–330 rpm, delivering 4–6 rounds per second into the engagement window, which — combined with the 8–14 m lethal radius of the PFHE — provides a substantially larger effective "lethal volume" per second than any 12.7 mm solution. For environments where Group II–III threats are the primary concern and the cost of APKWS is considered disproportionate, the modernised Bofors 40 mm represents the optimal balance between unit round cost, lethal radius and engagement range.



24. RAND Corporation. (2024). Affordable mass: The future of unmanned systems and counter-UAS in high-intensity conflict (Research Report No. RR-A1100-2). RAND Project Air Force. BAE Systems Bofors AB. (2023). BOFI-R CPK analysis for Group II–III targets. BAE Systems Bofors. The RAND methodology and the Saab/BAE Bofors CPK figures use consistent assumptions: per-engagement cost = ammunition consumed (1/Pk rounds) × unit round cost + marginal system wear cost per round.


 9. Manned Airborne Platforms in the C-UAS Role

9.1.Gunship Aircraft
The AC-130J Ghostrider includes the M197 20 mm rotary cannon (750 rpm, 1,500 m effective range against aerial targets); lateral APKWS 70 mm pod integration is under Lockheed Martin study. The MC-208 Combat Caravan (USAF SOCOM) with lateral APKWS pods was tested positively in 2022 at ~USD 800–1,200 per flight hour. The Turkish industry has developed ALKAR 40 mm external pod integration on the C-130 Hercules and the TAI HÜRKUS-C armed trainer, creating cost-effective C-UAS gunship capability at USD 800–1,200 per flight hour (Botma, 2023; SNC, 2023; TAI, 2024; Aselsan, 2024c).25
9.2.Attack Helicopters and COIN Aircraft
The AH-64E Apache and AH-1Z Viper are APKWS-certified with EO/IR sensors for Group II–III tracking; the AH-1Z achieved Pk of 81% against drone surrogates at NAS Fallon in 2023. The H145M with HForce integrates 12.7 mm HMP400 pod and APKWS-compatible FZ275 LGR rockets at ~USD 3,000–5,000 per flight hour. The A-29 Super Tucano (two M3M 12.7 mm + FZ275 LGR pods, ~USD 1,500–2,500 per hour) and AT-802U Sky Warden (USAF SOCOM, ~USD 1,200 per hour, endurance > 8 hours) provide the most cost-effective long-endurance C-UAS coverage for medium-threat theatres (BAE Systems, 2023b; Bell Textron, 2024; Airbus Helicopters, 2023; Embraer, 2023; Air Tractor/L3Harris, 2024).26
9.3.Vulnerabilities and Airspace Deconfliction
Primary risks of airborne C-UAS platforms: reciprocal FPV attack (documented in Ukraine against Mi-8 during landing) and fratricide with active ground C-UAS systems. Mitigation requires on-board radar/EW guard for early UAS detection, airspace deconfliction protocols within the C-UAS zone, and STANAG 4676 Friendly Force Tracking compliance across all active systems (Watling & Reynolds, 2023; JAPCC, 2023; NATO STO, 2023).27

25. Botma, J. (2023). The AC-130J Ghostrider gunship: Evolution of a concept. Air & Space Power Journal, 37(2), 45–62. Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC). (2023). MC-208 Combat Caravan: C-UAS mission profile and APKWS integration. SNC. TAI (Turkish Aerospace Industries). (2024). HÜRKU■-C armed trainer: C-UAS capability with ALKAR 40mm AGL integration. TAI Technical Documentation. Aselsan. (2024c). GÖKTÜRK EW pod and ALKAR 40mm integration on C-130 platform. Aselsan AS.
26. BAE Systems. (2023b). Apache AH-64E Guardian: APKWS integration and C-UAS role. BAE Systems Rotary & Mission Systems. Bell Textron. (2024). AH-1Z Viper: C-1U4AS capability with APKWS and M197 20mm. Bell Flight.
AH-1Z tests at NAS Fallon (2023) documented Pk of 81% against drone surrogates at 150 km/h. Airbus Helicopters. (2023). H145M with HForce: C-UAS role and 70mm LGR integration. Airbus Helicopters. Embraer Defense & Security. (2023). A-29 Super Tucano: C-UAS role assessment. Embraer Defence. Air Tractor / L3Harris Technologies. (2024).
 10. Operational Lessons: Ukraine and the Middle Eastern Theatre
The Ukrainian theatre empirically validated layered defence: vehicle-mounted 12.7 mm systems and small-calibre automatic cannon (23 mm ZSU-23-4) formed the most cost-efficient lower layer (CPK USD 200–5,000 against FPV), while missile system attrition against low-value drones critically degraded readiness against ballistic threats — the defining lesson that has accelerated interest in all solutions examined in this paper (Bronk et al., 2022; Watling & Reynolds, 2023; TRADOC, 2024; Cranny-Evans, 2023).28
Operation "True Promise" (April 2024) confirmed that ~40% of Shahed-136s were intercepted by the air component (F-15/F-16 with AIM-9X, CPK ~USD 400,000–600,000), while high-end missile systems (Arrow-3: CPK USD 3–12 million; David's Sling: ~USD 1 million) were reserved for ballistic threats. Ground-launched APKWS 70 mm could have intercepted equivalent Shahed targets at CPK USD 35,000–70,000 — a potential saving of 80–90%; the modernised Bofors 40 mm with PFHE at CPK USD 3,000–18,000 would represent an even more economical solution for engagements within 4,000 m (IISS, 2024; Cordesman, 2024; Harel & Issacharoff, 2024; CRS, 2024).29

Note. Reproduced from Title of Image, by VoidWanderer, Year, Wikimedia Commons (URL). Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.

28. Bronk et al. (2022). RUSI. Watling & Reynolds (2023). RUSI. TRADOC (2024). U.S. Army. Cranny -Evans, S. (2023, August). Russian offensive war on Ukraine: Unmanned systems in the land domain. RUSI Occasional Paper.
These four documents constitute the most comprehensive empirical corpus available for C-UAS analysis in the Ukrainian theatre for 2022–2024.
29. IISS. (2024). The military balance 2024. Routledge. Cordesman, A. H. (2024). Israel, Iran, and the changing patterns of regional warfare. CSIS. https://doi.org/10.26609/csis.23.0601. Harel, A., & Issacharoff, A. (2024). 34 days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the war in Lebanon (Updated ed.).
Palgrav1e5 Macmillan. Congressional Research Service (CRS). (2024, March). Israel: Background and U.S. relations in brief (Report No. R44245). U.S. Congress.
 11. Economic Analysis: The Cost-per-Kill Matrix
The cost-per-kill metric — total cost of neutralising a single UAS target including ammunition, system amortisation and operating costs — is the principal comparative evaluation tool (RAND Corporation, 2024).30
Group I FPV drones (unit cost USD 300–800): 12.7 mm with assisted fire control → CPK USD 200–5,000 (lowest). 40 mm AGL airburst → CPK USD 1,000–8,000 (higher Pk). Saab BlindFire 12.7 mm (automated) → CPK USD 300–6,000. APKWS 70 mm → CPK USD 28,000–70,000 (economically irrational for this category). SHORAD missiles → CPK USD 300,000–8,000,000 (incompatible with engagement sustainability).
Group II–III loitering munitions (Shahed-136 class, unit cost USD 20,000–50,000): Bofors 40 mm L70 PFHE → CPK USD 3,000–18,000 (optimal within 4,000 m). APKWS 70 mm ground-launched → CPK USD 28,000–70,000 (optimal at 1,500–3,000 m). Saab BlindFire 40 mm AGL → CPK USD 5,000–25,000. Vehicle systems with 30–40 mm cannon (Skyranger, RAPIDFire) → CPK USD 500–30,000. Airborne APKWS → CPK USD 80,000– 200,000 (platform operating cost adds significantly). Iron Dome Tamir → CPK USD 50,000– 100,000 (comparable but finite stockpile).
A sustainable C-UAS defence must assign each threat category to the system with the most favourable CPK, reserving missile systems for high-value targets (ballistic missiles, strategic drones).
Full implementation reduces total defence costs by at least one to two orders of magnitude versus a missile-only architecture, with the Bofors 40 mm and Saab BlindFire family filling critical niches between the 12.7 mm first layer and the SHORAD missile systems (Jones, 2023; CRS, 2024).31



30. RAND Corporation. (2024). Affordable mass (Research Report No. RR-A1100-2). RAND Project Air Force. The RAND methodology accounts for: ammunition expended per engagement (function of Pk), system amortisation over 10 years, personnel, maintenance and logistics. Values cited are total operational CPK, not ammunition -only CPK.
31. Jones, S. G. (2023). Ukraine's coming summer offensive. CSIS. CRS. (2024). Israel: Background and U.S. relations. Both sources agree that a medium-sized army exhausts SHORAD interceptor stocks within 3–6 months of high-intensity UAS conflict, making economic rationalisation of the threat-system assignment imperative.
 12. Doctrinal and Acquisition Recommendations
Based on the analysis conducted, the following recommendations are formulated for NATO member state armed forces (NATO, 2022; JAPCC, 2023; NATO STO, 2023).32
First — multi-layer architecture. Adopt a four-layer C-UAS architecture with automated threat assignment: (1) early warning with dedicated AESA radars on mobile platforms; (2) SHORAD missile intercept for Group III–V threats; (3) Bofors 40 mm L70/L90 BOFI-R or equivalent medium-calibre system for Group II–III at 1,500–4,000 m; (4) Saab BlindFire or CROWS III C-UAS with 12.7 mm / 40 mm AGL and AI fire control for Group I–II at < 1,500 m.
Second — Ground vehicle procurement. Launch acquisition programmes for HMMWV/JLTV C-UAS with CROWS III and APKWS rails for light infantry brigades; transportable TRAP/MRADS emplacements for FOB protection; and Saab BlindFire or equivalent automated RCWS with integrated radar for units requiring engagement without operator optical acquisition.
Third — Bofors L70/L90 modernisation. For armed forces with existing Bofors 40 mm inventories, prioritise BOFI-R or equivalent fire-control upgrades (DRDO AESA radar for Indian forces; Nammo PFHE ammunition for all users) to transform Cold War anti-aircraft systems into credible C-UAS assets at 85–90% lower cost than new-build equivalents.
Fourth — 40 mm AGL standardisation. Standardise the 40 mm AGL with programmable airburst rounds (Aselsan ALKAR, Mk 47 Striker, HK GMG) as the close-defence C-UAS layer on all light tactical vehicles and airborne gunship/COIN platforms, given CPK of USD 1,000–8,000 for Group I–II.
Fifth — Dedicated airborne component. Integrate armed light helicopters (H145M HForce) or COIN aircraft (A-29 Super Tucano, AT-802U Sky Warden) with APKWS 70 mm / 40 mm AGL for medium-threat theatres requiring long-endurance C-UAS coverage at USD 800– 5,000 per flight hour.
Sixth — Ammunition and training. Scale organic holdings of 12.7 mm ammunition, 40 mm airburst rounds and Bofors 40 mm PFHE by a factor of 3–5× relative to current standards for units in high-UAS-density environments. Develop dedicated training for

32. NATO. (2022). ATP-3.3.5.2: Counter-UAS framework and procedures. NATO Standardization Office. JAPCC. (2023). Counter-unmanned aircraft systems: Training and education framework. NATO JAPCC Publication. NATO STO. (2023). Counter-UAS sensor fusion architectures (TR-SCI-350). NATO STO.
33. Davidson, C. (2024). DEVCOM Technical Report. JAPCC. (2023). Training and education framework. NATO STO. (2023). TR-SCI-350. These sources identify operator training as the primary non-technological bottleneck for C-UAS capability implementation in the 2025–2030 period.

radar/EO recognition of small-RCS drones, fire management under rules of engagement in complex environments, and operation of AI-assisted automated fire control including the BlindFire and BOFI-R engagement modes (Davidson, 2024; JAPCC, 2023; NATO STO, 2023).33

Note. Reproduced from Title of Image, by Ayonpradhan, Year, Wikimedia Commons (URL). Licensed under [Insert License, e.g., CC BY-SA 4.0].


 13. Conclusions
The UAS threat in contemporary conflicts has definitively exceeded the sustainability threshold of exclusively missile-based responses. The analysis presented demonstrates that low-cost kinetic solutions already available on the international market — when integrated into a layered defensive architecture — reduce the cost per intercept by one to two orders of magnitude compared with conventional SHORAD, while maintaining adequate effectiveness against Group I–III targets (Watling & Reynolds, 2023; IISS, 2024; RAND Corporation, 2024; Jones, 2023).34
This paper has made four original contributions to existing literature. First, a systematic analysis of ground vehicles specifically optimised for the C-UAS role with 12.7 mm and 70 mm weapons — demonstrating that HMMWV GHOST, JLTV C-UAS, CROWS III with APKWS, TRAP/MRADS emplacements and APKWS rail variants on Bradley and Stryker constitute a coherent low-cost deployable capability ecosystem. Second, the detailed analysis of the Saab RWS BlindFire as a uniquely automated multi-calibre RCWS — capable of engaging Group I–III targets without operator optical acquisition across 12.7 mm, 40 mm AGL and APKWS 70 mm configurations — with an automated engagement cycle of 2.8 seconds that exploits the full 5–15 second FPV engagement window. Third, comprehensive documentation of the Bofors 40 mm L70/L90 modernisation programmes — particularly the Swedish BOFI-R and the Indian L70U upgrade — showing that CPK of USD 3,000–18,000 against Group II–III loitering munitions can be achieved with existing weapon systems at 85– 90% lower cost than new-build C-UAS platforms, through investment in fire-control and programmable ammunition only. Fourth, the integration of 40 mm automatic grenade launchers as a standard close-defence C-UAS layer on both ground and airborne platforms, with the Aselsan ALKAR demonstrating the value of locally developed solutions in building national C-UAS capability within constrained budgets. The challenge is organisational and doctrinal, not technological: the solutions exist.


34. Watling & Reynolds (2023). RUSI. IISS (2024). Routledge. RAND Corporation (2024). RAND. Jones (2023). CSIS. These four studies provide the most robust empirical and analytical foundations for the conclusions of this paper, covering both the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern theatres and the comparative economic analysis.
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Author note. Stefano Peverati is an analyst specialising in weapons systems and military doctrine, with expertise in C-UAS systems, precision munitions and contemporary conflict analysis.
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official position of any governmental or military organisation.

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